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Abstract
Brazil has experienced crucial changes in its in￿ ation process since the adoption of in￿ ation
targeting in mid 1999. This article addresses changes in the analytical framework employed to
track the in￿ ation dynamics, speci￿cally the relevance of an explicit target for in￿ ation. A New-
Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is derived incorporating indexation not only to past in￿ ation
but also to in￿ ation targets, generalizing the Woodford (2003) hybrid curve.
In our modeling, ￿rms that do not optimally set their prices in a given period adjust them only
by indexing their previous prices to a weighted average of the in￿ ation target and lagged in￿ ation.
In such a framework, the impact of in￿ ation targets on agents￿decisions regarding the supply
side can be analytically measured by the parameter associated to the in￿ ation target. It is shown
that in￿ ation target a⁄ects the welfare-based monetary policy objective function by penalizing
deviations of actual in￿ ation from target instead of from zero. This result establishes the micro
foundation basis for ad-hoc loss functions as indicated in traditional literature. Therefore, the
in￿ ation target also a⁄ects the optimal target criterion.
We also present a microfounded speci￿cation to model in￿ ation expectations, and conclude that
when ￿rms attribute a high weight to the government￿ s in￿ ation target when setting their own
prices, exchange rate and demand shocks are unable to alter signi￿cantly in￿ ation expectations.
Such a result gives some light to empirical ad hoc assessment conducted in traditional literature.
Our empirical evidence shows that even after major shocks, the target ability of anchoring
in￿ ation has been restored. Although not formally tested, such a fact followed the monetary au-
thorities￿￿rm commitment to meet the in￿ ation targets, reinforced by the government￿ s necessary
support through a consistent ￿scal policy.
Keywords: In￿ ation targets; in￿ ation dynamics; in￿ ation inertia; in￿ ation expectations; unit
labor cost; microfounded macroeconomic models; optimal monetary policy.
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 1 Introduction
What are the consequences of adopting an explicit target for in￿ ation? Since the early 1990s,
a growing number of central banks in industrial and emerging countries have considered this
question, including the US1.
The in￿ ation targeting literature points out that much of its bene￿ts can be attributed
to its impact on in￿ ation expectations2. Woodford (2004) argues that the most important
achievement of in￿ ation-targeting central banks has not been the reorientation of the goals of
monetary policy toward a stronger emphasis on controlling in￿ ation, but rather the development
of an approach to the conduct of policy that focuses on a clearly de￿ned target. According to
him, one important advantage of commitment to an appropriately chosen policy rule is that it
facilitates public understanding of policy, which is crucial in order for monetary policy to be
most e⁄ective3.
This seems to be the case in Brazil. As pointed out by Cerisola and Gelos (2005), the
adoption of an explicit and public target for in￿ ation in￿ uenced the expectations of private
agents. The authors examine the macroeconomic determinants of survey in￿ ation expectations
in Brazil since the adoption of in￿ ation targeting in 1999. The results suggest that the in￿ ation
targeting framework has helped anchor expectations, with the dispersion of in￿ ation expecta-
tions declining considerably. They also ￿nd that the in￿ ation target has been instrumental in
shaping expectations while the importance of past in￿ ation in determining expectations appears
to be relatively low.
The success of in￿ ation targeting is solidly based on credibility. Private agents must believe
that the central bank will act consistently within the in￿ ation targeting framework. During the
process of credibility construction in the context of large shocks, however, even a strong response
by the monetary authority, will not be able to prevent expectations to deviate from the targets.
In this case communication with the public so as to explain the reasons of the breach becomes
crucial. Furthermore, it is important that expectations converge to the target over a certain
time horizon. Minella et al (2003) presented some evidence on the behavior of the Central
Bank of Brazil, private agents￿expectations, and changes in in￿ ation dynamics. The authors
conclude that the Central Bank of Brazil has been reacting strongly to expected in￿ ation. It
conducts monetary policy in a forward-looking manner, and responds to in￿ ationary pressures.
Although the actual in￿ ation has been above the upper limit of the tolerance interval in 2001
and 2002, the in￿ ation-targeting regime has been successful in anchoring expectations, with a
substantial reduction in the degree of in￿ ation persistence after in￿ ation targeting was adopted.
This is a direct consequence of credibility gains that the Central Bank of Brazil has obtained
since the implementation of the new regime. Credibility, however, is still under construction as
it takes time to achieve and great e⁄ort to preserve.
Next section summarizes Brazilian in￿ ation targeting framework. In section 3 we present
the analytical framework that captures the changes in in￿ ation dynamics highlighted in the
empirical works mentioned before. The adoption of an explicit target for in￿ ation together
with a perceived commitment of the monetary authority to pursue this target were, to a large
extend, responsible for the remarkable change in the in￿ ation process during the period, mainly
in regards to in￿ ation persistence. Section 4 present an extension to a small-open economy and
derives a theoretical equation for expectations on future in￿ ation, giving some light to empirical
ad hoc assesment, conducted in traditional literature. Then, the section assesses the credibility
process using the framework presented and test the robustness of such a theoretical formation
1According to Mishkin (2004a), the Federal Reserve should adopt in￿ ation targeting.
2See Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001) for a survey of early experiences with in￿ ation targeting. Ball and
Sheridan (2003) present a more pessimistic view from experience to date.
3In Woodford￿ s (2004) own words "For not only do expectations about policy matter, but, at least under
current conditions, very little else matters."
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 role of expectations. Section 5 concludes and points out the challenges ahead.
2 In￿ ation targeting in Brazil
Soon after changing to a ￿ oating exchange rate regime in 1999, Brazil has adopted an explicit
in￿ ation targeting framework as part of an extensive program of economic reforms. This devel-
opment ended a period during which the exchange rate had been the main anchor for monetary
policy4. In June 1999, a presidential decree established the new monetary framework, whose
key points are listed bellow:
￿ Adoption of an explicit target for in￿ ation;
￿ In￿ ation targets as well as the respective tolerance intervals were to be set by the National
Monetary Council on the basis of a proposal by the Minister of Finance5;
￿ Targets to be set no later than June 30, two years in advance;
￿ The Central Bank was given the responsibility to implement the policies necessary to
achieve the targets;
￿ The Central Bank were to issue a quarterly in￿ ation report that would provide information
on the performance of the framework, the results of monetary policy actions, and the
outlook for in￿ ation; and
￿ In case the targets were breached, the Central Bank￿ s Governor would be required to
issue an open letter to the Minister of Finance explaining the causes of the breach, the
measures to be adopted to ensure that in￿ ation returns to the tolerated levels, and the
period of time that will be needed for these measures to take e⁄ect.
The mounting uncertainties after the ￿ oating of the real in early 1999 enticed the im-
plementation of a more strict in￿ ation targeting framework, one that would represent a ￿rm
commitment to prevent in￿ ation from getting out of control. Also, the relatively loose ￿scal
stance at the outset of the new regime as well as the lack of formal operational autonomy of the
Central Bank presented additional challenges to the conduct of monetary policy, in particular
to the construction of credibility. In order to deal with these concerns, the Central Bank has
adopted a ￿ exible and accountable approach in conducting policy. For instance, even when the
targets were breached and revised, the process was undertaken in a very transparent manner
through open letters from the Central Bank. As noted by Mishkin (2004b), the role of the
Central Bank in this accomplishment provides a good example for other emerging markets con-
sidering adopting in￿ ation targeting: the way the Central Bank articulated the reasons why
the initial in￿ ation target was missed, how it responded to the shock, and how it planned to
return to its longer-run in￿ ation goal.
The new regime has been tested in a number of di⁄erent ways during its short lifetime, with
the intensity and frequency of shocks being unprecedented. Despite challenging conditions the
new monetary framework has proven to be an e⁄ective guide for expectations. Even when
current in￿ ation deviated from the established targets, monetary policy under in￿ ation target
was, most of the times, capable of keeping in￿ ation expectations in line with the o¢ cial in￿ ation
targets. In the following section we will formally analyze how the adoption of an explicit target
for in￿ ation a⁄ects in￿ ation dynamics and monetary policy.
4For an extensive analysis about in￿ ation targeting in Brazil see Bogdanski et al (2000), Bogdanski et al
(2001), Minella et al (2002), and Minella et al (2003).
5Brazilian in￿ ation targets, tolerance bands, and outcomes are showed in Figure 1 in the Appendix.
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 3 Changes in the in￿ ation process: analytical framework
The standard approach to characterize the in￿ ation process is some kind of Phillips curve rela-
tion, speci￿cally the so-called "New-Keynesian" Phillips curve (NKPC), which can be derived
from ￿rst principles based on assumption about nominal rigidities6 and possesses the well know
speci￿cation
￿t = ￿xt + ￿Et￿t+1 (1)
where xt is a measure of the output gap, ￿t is the in￿ ation rate and Et is the expectation
operator based on date t information set7. The parameter ￿ measures the combined impact
of nominal and real rigidities while ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount coe¢ cient of the representative
household. This speci￿cation has two sound characteristics: (i) it is derived from ￿rst principles
and thus can deals with the Lucas (1976) critic, and (ii) it emphasizes the importance of the






The message of equation (2) is straightforward: if the monetary authority stabilizes all
future stream of output gaps it also stabilizes in￿ ation. Not only the current conditions of the
economy are relevant but also the economic outlook.
Although appealing, the NKPC has problems when faced with the facts, speci￿cally because
the absence of any inertial component. As we can see from equation (2), the NKPC is completely
forward-looking, while it does not seem to be the case of in￿ ation in any country8. In order
to make the NKPC compatible with the data, some sort of backward looking behavior should
be introduced. Assume that the fraction of ￿rms that do not optimally readjust their prices in
a certain period use a cost free rule-of-thumb based on lagged in￿ ation. As a result, Phillips
curve assume the so-called hybrid speci￿cation as follows
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 = ￿xt + ￿Et [￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t] (3)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 measures the degree of indexation to the most recently available in￿ ation
measure.9. Iterating this equation forward one obtains





Now, even if the central bank stabilizes the output gap from now on, the same would not
occur with current in￿ ation since it is in￿ uenced by its own recent history.
A typical exercise undertaken to measure the relative importance of the past versus future
components of in￿ ation is to estimate equation (3) and compare the weights associated with the
backward versus forward looking components. Although relevant, it does not provide evidence
of the impact of the adoption of an o¢ cial target for in￿ ation, after all, there are other events
occurring in the economy that should induce the private sector to act in a more forward looking
fashion. In the next section, we will present a straightforward extension of the hybrid model
that can be used to assess the relevance of adopting an o¢ cial in￿ ation target.
6The model of nominal rigidities proposed by Calvo (1983) was used in this case.
7For a step-by-step derivation in a general-equilibrium model see Woodford (2003).
8Some references are in Woodford (2003), Gal￿ and Gertler (1999) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995), among
others.
9A detailed derivation of the hybrid curve is presented in Woodford (2003). A slightly di⁄erent derivation,
together with its empirical relevance in the US, is presented in Gal￿ and Gertler (1999).
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 3.1 Targets and in￿ ation dynamics
Why should agents only consider lagged in￿ ation in their rule-of-thumb decisions? In an in￿ ation
targeting economy it is natural to assume that pricing decisions should also incorporate the

















t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1 (6)
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 is the weight associated to the in￿ ation target ￿o
t for the current period,
which, in the case of Brazil, is de￿ned at least one year in advance by an institution other
than the Central Bank of Brazil, the National Monetary Council, and so it is not a⁄ected
by the monetary policy12. Although tempting, the association of ￿ with credibility should be
made with care since there are other aspects that cannot be captured by the model. First of
all, any measure of credibility should be policy-dependent13. Even considering the proposed
time-dependent model as a ￿rst stylized representation of a richier state-dependent approach,
it is clear that the timing between monetary policy changes and its e⁄ects on the economy
may cause ￿ reductions even though both the target and the monetary authority may be full
credible. Another limitation is the absence of ￿scal considerations, which can be taken into
account in any measure of credibility. A more subtle issue is how to distinguish policy-making
credibility from target credibility since they are mutually dependent.
The consequences of this extension on the in￿ ation dynamics can be assessed by iterating








Although similar in form, equations (3) and (5) are di⁄erent in spirit in a crucial aspect.
Now, if the central bank stabilizes all the future sequence of output gaps, in￿ ation converges
to its target in the long-run provided that ￿ > 0. Otherwise the model resembles the hybrid
curve with ￿ = 114.
3.2 Targets and optimal monetary policy
The adoption of an explicit target for in￿ ation also a⁄ects optimal monetary policy. It can















10As an example of a similar idea, Yun (1996) assumes that prices are automatically increased at some rate
￿ ￿ between occasions on which they are reconsidered. In that case, however, ￿ ￿ is not directly associated with
the in￿ ation target but instead it is the actual long-run average rate of in￿ ation of the economy.
11Its formal analitycal derivation is presented in Appendix B.
12Note that equation (5) nest the hybrid curve as a particular case in which in￿ ation target is zero in all
periods.
13Although not considered as a direct credibility measure, ￿ evolution should also be state-dependent, so our
time-invariant ￿ shall be analyzed with caution in the light of the Lucas critic.
14Empiric evidence towards ￿ = 1 is presented by Giannoni and Woodford (2003) in a complete model of the
monetary transmission mechanism without in￿ ation targets.
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 where ￿ is a constant and the weight ￿ is based on the deep parameters of the economy,
speci￿cally, ￿ = ￿
￿, where ￿ is the coe¢ cient associated with output in the NKPC and ￿
represents the elasticity of substitution between goods in the economy15.







(xt ￿ xt￿1) = 0 (9)
This so-called optimal target criterion16 indicates that deviations of the in￿ ation rate from
￿￿
t should be accepted as long as they are negatively proportional to output gap variations,
xt ￿ xt￿1, over the same period.
This criterion nests the standard and the hybrid problem as particular cases. For instance,
under the hybrid curve paradigm with ￿ = 1, equation (9) becomes
￿t ￿ ￿t￿1 +
￿
￿
(xt ￿ xt￿1) = 0 (10)
indicating that the acceptable in￿ ation forecast for the current period should depend not only
on the expected variation in output gap, but also on recent past in￿ ation rate: a higher existing
in￿ ation rate justi￿es a higher expected near-term in￿ ation rate, in the case of any given output-




xt = ￿￿1 (11)
indicating that in each period the right hand side of this last equation should equal the target
￿￿1 = ￿￿1+
￿
￿x￿1. This result, presented in Giannoni and Woodford (2003), has now a natural
interpretation: without a target anchoring ￿rm￿ s pricesetting behavior, the best monetary
policy can do is to keep ￿t unchanged.
Remember that such conclusions would also be made under our proposed generalizing ap-





(xt ￿ xt￿1) = ￿
o
t (12)
Now we have a direct relation between optimal policy and the explicit in￿ ation target: the
monetary policy should be managed in order to keep the left-hand-side of (12) equal to the
o¢ cial target.
In the next section we show an extension of our model for the case of a small-open economy.
We also derive a microfounded formation rule for in￿ ation expectations, which predicts that
when ￿rms attribute a high weight to the government￿ s in￿ ation target when setting their on
prices, exchange rate and demand shocks are unable to alter signi￿cantly in￿ ation expectations.
Next, we use the Brazilian in￿ ation targeting period (1999-2004) to assess the relevance
of the model. Close attention will be devoted to the evolution of the target parameter ￿,
assessed with recursive estimation. Then, we use its time varying estimates in order to test the
robustness of the microfounded in￿ ation expectation formation role.
15This loss function derivation and analysis are also presented in Appendix B. For an extensive explanation
about deriving microfunded welfare based central bank loss functions, see Woodford (2003). Basically, it is a
second order Taylor approximation of the welfare function around an e¢ cient steady state. Its functional form
is crucially in￿ uenced by the assumed source of price stickiness assumption, in this case, the Calvo￿ s (1983)
model.
16Following Giannoni and Woodford (2003), we obtain an optimal target criterion under a timeless perspective,
in which the central bank is supposed to have been always committed to such a rule in the past, so it is time
consistent. In alternative approaches, the central bank is supposed to commit to an optimum rule from period
zero on. In such approaches, optimal rules are not time consistent, for allowing incentives that induce the central
bank to break its vow in initial period, keeping its commitment only from the following period on. Hence, such
a rule cannot be perceived as credible by economic agents.
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 4 Assessing the role played by the in￿ ation target
Dealing with the pass-through from depreciation to in￿ ation has been one of the main challenges
to the in￿ ation-targeting regime in emerging markets economies. Brazil is not an exception, as
can be seen by the evolution of the nominal and real exchange rate presented in Figures 3 and
4 respectively17. Emerging markets seem to be more sensitive to the e⁄ects of ￿nancial crises
than industrialized countries. Exchange rate market volatility generates frequent revisions of
in￿ ation rate expectations and may result in non-ful￿llment of in￿ ation targets.
In order to analyze the impact of ￿ during the in￿ ation targeting period we estimate an
open economy NKPC based on the following equation18
￿H;t ￿ ￿
￿







This curve can be derived from a small-open economy model analogous to the one presented
by Gal￿ and Monacelli (2004). Note that this new speci￿cation is very similar to the one
valid for closed economies. The only di⁄erence is the appearance of ￿H;t, the in￿ ation rate of
domestically produced and consumed goods prices due the fact that domestic ￿rms decide on
domestic prices.
Furthermore, one may obtain an expression relating the market in￿ ation rate, ￿t, that
aggregates domestic and imported goods price in￿ ation, to ￿H;t




where qt is the real exchange rate gap from its steady state value, so ￿qt measures its deprecia-
tion rate, and ￿ 2 (0;1) is a parameter inversely related to the home bias on consumer decisions
about his consumption basket. The lower is ￿, the less is the consumption of imported goods.
Therefore, one may combine these expressions and obtain
￿t = ￿
￿









Et [￿qt ￿ ￿￿qt+1] (15)
Hence, considering the de￿nition of real exchange rate and ￿￿
t, these last expressions may
be combined into the following result, where ￿
f
t represents the imported goods in￿ ation rate,
denominated in foreign currency
￿t = ￿￿
o



















+ ~ ￿xt (16)
In line with frontier econometric analysis for microfounded nominal rigidities models, we
considered a more fundamental speci￿cation for our NKPC. Indeed, the output gap term was
only shown in our previous equation due to a slightly strong hypothesis regarding to the func-
tional form of ￿rms production function. As a matter of fact, if such an assumption were not
made, we would obtain a very similar NKPC in which the output gap term would be replaced
by the ￿rms￿average marginal cost, as follows:
￿t = ￿￿
o




















17For a speci￿c analysis about exchange rate pass-through in Brazil see Belaisch (2003).
18For ease of reference, all data series￿descriptions, together with its sources, are de￿ned in Table 2 in the
Appendix.
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 where mcH;t is the real marginal cost in terms of domestic prices. The relation between mcH;t
and the real marginal cost mct in terms of overall aggregated prices is the following






























4.1 The role of in￿ ation targets on in￿ ation expectations
Monetary policy ultimately aims at maintaining in￿ ation controlled at low levels, regardless
the way it is implemented, being that by targeting money, exchange rate, or, more explicitly,
in￿ ation. In pursuing that goal the role of in￿ ation expectations becomes crucial. Most micro-
founded macroeconomic models attach considerable importance to the role of central banks in
measuring and shaping in￿ ation expectations towards their targets, whether explicit or not.
But which role do the targets play in shaping in￿ ation expectations? Recursively solving
equation19 (16) and after some algebraic manipulation20, we obtain the following speci￿cation
for Et￿t+1, which sheds some light on this question.
Et￿t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)














Et￿qt+1 + ~ ￿
￿







Such a result is also presented in Alves et al (2005), in which the authors assess the evolving
in￿ ation process in Brazil.
Note that in￿ ation expectations Et￿t+1 positively depends: on lagged in￿ ation rates, on
the in￿ ation target path, on current output gap, on current real exchange rate variation and
on expectations about future output gaps and real exchange rate variations. Note that if
households were habit-persistent, current output gap would depend on lagged output gap and
on lagged real interest rates, thereby Et￿t+1 would also depend on such variables.
According to equation (19), ￿ = 1 implies that Et￿t+1 neither depends on lagged in￿ ation
rates nor on the current output gap (or lagged in case of habit-persistence) and real exchange
variations. Rather, it depends on predetermined in￿ ation targets, with ￿o
t+1 coe¢ cient achieving
its maximum when ￿ = 1, and on expected future real exchange rate variations and output
gaps. On the other extreme, ￿ = 0 implies that lagged in￿ ation rates, current real exchange
rate variations and output gaps play an important role in forming in￿ ation expectations, but
the in￿ ation targets are not relevant anymore in that regard.
So, the closer to the unit is ￿, the less current output gap and real exchange rate vari-
ation a⁄ect in￿ ation expectations. In other words, as long ￿ is close to 1 current exchange
rate and output gap shocks have a little e⁄ect on Et￿t+1. In that case, aggregated demand
19We chose such an speci￿cation for pragmatic reasons: it has a term with the output gap, which is important
since many central banks and economic agents use such an activity variable for empirical analysis.
20Its derivation is shown in Appendix C.
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jxt+j, which are expected to smoothly evolve and remain closer to zero than do their
current realizations.
Thus, if ￿ is close enough to 1, Et￿t+1 shall be pegged to the in￿ ation targets and empirical
evidence will point out to the relevance of in￿ ation targets in driving in￿ ation expectations.
We test the robustness of such a formation role further on in subsection 4.6, where we com-
pare our microfounded formation role with three ad hoc empirical formation roles for Brazilian
in￿ ation.
4.2 Econometric approach
In order to implement econometric analysis with quarterly Brazilian data, it was necessary to
create an in￿ ation target measure for the period ranging 1995Q1 to 1998Q4, previous to the
in￿ ation targeting adoption. During such period, the o¢ cial exchange rate policy consisted of
an intended nominal devaluation of 7.5 percent, on an exchange rate crawling peg regime, as
explained in Bogdanski et al (2000). Additionally, such period was characterized by a near time
invariant real exchange rate. Therefore, it was if there was an o¢ cial in￿ ation target resulting
from maintaining the real exchange rate in a constant level even though nominal exchange rate
was set to devaluate at the de￿ned rate. Thus, we could create an in￿ ation target series for the




















From 1999Q1 and 1999Q2, there was not an o¢ cial nominal anchor, so we imposed the
restrictions ￿1999Q1 = 0 and ￿1999Q2 = 0. From 1999Q3 on, Central Bank of Brazil has been
pursuing end-of-year in￿ ation targets, so there are no quarterly o¢ cial in￿ ation targets. There-
fore, the simplest solution was to consider that the quarterly in￿ ation targets were ￿xed, in
each year, at a quarter of the corresponding end-of year o¢ cial values.
As the in￿ ation rate ￿t, we considered the Brazilian broad consumer price index (IPCA),
used to gauge Brazilian in￿ ation targets. In order to ￿lter the strong seasonal pattern present
until 1998Q4, we considered a ￿ltered series, obtained by the general full sample asymmetric
band-pass (from 3.1 to 4 quarters) frequency ￿lter of Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003). Since
Brazilian in￿ ation seasonal pattern seemed to change over time and was di¢ cult to extract
due to strong external shocks that a⁄ected Brazilian IPCA in￿ ation rate in 2001 and 2002, we
believed this ￿ltering process was appropriated due to the fact that this asymmetric ￿lter is
time varying with its parameters depending on the data and changing for each observation.
Figure 2 shows the obtained ￿ltered in￿ ation.
As the foreign in￿ ation rate measure ￿
f
t, we considered the US export price index variation
rate (all commodities). Therefore, real exchange rates were constructed considering those in-
￿ ation rates. As in Goldfajn and Werlang (2000), detrended (Hodrick-Prescott Filter)21 real
exchange rate was considered as a proxy to qt, as illustrated in Figure 4.
As a measure of ￿rms aggregated marginal cost, we constructed the proxy mct = wtLt=￿Yt,
where wt is the real wage index, Lt is the occupied labor force, ￿ is the income labor share and
Yt is the GDP. Since the only uninterrupted Brazilian series of labor force is the one released
21See Hodrick and Prescott (1997). For an interesting generalization, also see Araœjo, Areosa, and Rodrigues
Neto (2003).
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 by Seade22 for Sªo Paulo￿ s metropolitan region, mct was constructed with data proceeding
from that region. For quarterly Sªo Paulo￿ s GDP measure, we interpolated its annual share
to the Brazilian GDP and applied the resulting quarterly share to quarterly Brazilian GDP23.
Regarding to the income labor share, we considered ￿ = 0:6, the Brazilian adjusted estimative
made by Gomes et al (2002).
Hence, we estimated the following structural equation with a Two Stage Least Squares
procedure, since there were contemporaneous and future regressors that could be correlated






















j=￿1, the Brazilian C-Bond spread over (US) treasury.
The intercept coe¢ cient was imposed in order to capture possible estimating level bias in the
latent marginal cost measure and in the real exchange rate gap. If such term was neglected,
parameter estimates could be biased due to the omitted variable speci￿cation.
￿t = A0 + A1￿
o
















+A4mct + A5qt + "t (21)
The parameters estimates in the full sample are presented in Table 1. As can be seen, the
parameter associated with the target is quantitatively relevant and statistically signi￿cant, with
a value of almost 0.70. Note also that the short-term exchange rate pass-through coe¢ cient is
both signi￿cant and low, with a value of about 5 percent. This estimative is in line with the
values estimated in the recent literature of most countries where a ￿ oating exchange regime is
adopted. Indeed, it means that Brazilian economy is still essentially closed, due the fact that
the home bias parameter ￿ = 0:053
1+0:053 = 0:05. Another parameter that is also signi￿cant is A5,
regarded to the real exchange rate gap. Remember that this variable is a component of the
real marginal costs in terms of domestic consumed products mcH;t. As the results indicate,
this variable is relevant to explain Brazilian consumer in￿ ation, although neglected in some
empirical works in the literature that are used to consider only the unit labor cost mct. On
the other hand, our econometric procedure rejected the hypothesis that our measure of unit
labor cost is relevant, for its coe¢ cient A4 is not signi￿cant. Nevertheless, a Wald test do not
reject the null hypothesis that A4 = A3=A5 (p-value = 0.25), as should be if the structural
Phillips curve presented in equation (18) above performs ￿ne to model actual Brazilian supply
side. Note also that the preferences intertemporal discounting parameter ￿, represented by
A2, was sub estimated by our regression, since one expected it to be close to the unity. This
result may suggest that Brazilian agents are impatient in their consuming decisions, but it may
be only a consequence of correlated regressors. Since our empirical evidence points out that
in￿ ation target are an important variable in explaining current in￿ ation, future in￿ ation should
be also explained by future in￿ ation targets and so should be current expectation regarding
future in￿ ation. Hence, Et￿t+1 must be correlated with ￿o
t+1 and some estimation problems may
arise. On the other hand, some results points out that using di⁄erent unit labor cost measures
would modify our estimative of ￿, due to spurious in-sample correlation between Et￿t+1 and
mct. Although our estimatives of ￿ seemed to be robust to such sources of problem, future
extensions should concern more attention on this issue.
In order to map the evolution of the weight associated with the target we perform recursive
22Funda￿ªo Sistema Estadual de AnÆlise de Dados (www.seade.gov.br). A more traditional measure for labor
force is released by Instituto Brasileiro de Geogra￿a e Estat￿stica (IBGE). But its series methodology changed
in 2001, and regardless the fact that the old series is updated only until December 2002, the new series was not
applied to previous years, starting in January 2001.
23See Appendix for details.
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 estimations of our Phillips curve24. The evolution of the parameter ￿ is showed in Figure 5,
with a con￿dence interval of 2 standard errors. In almost all sub samples, this parameter was
signi￿cant in explaining in￿ ation.
The recursive estimates of ￿ indicate that the weight associated with the o¢ cial in￿ ation
target increases in periods when in￿ ation expectations are close enough to the o¢ cial targets.
The period can be separated in three sub-samples: (i) 1999 ￿2000, the implementation phase,
(ii) 2001 ￿2002, the stress test, (iii) 2003 ￿2004, the restoration of credibility.
4.3 Implementing IT: 1999 - 2000
During the ￿rst two years, ￿ increased with regularity from closed to 0.50 in mid 1999 to
approximately 0.75 at the end of 2000. Despite the adoption of IT in Brazil had occurred in
the midst of a foreign exchange crisis, the transition to the new regime in 1999 was relatively
smooth. Against all pessimistic views, in￿ ation at the end of 1999 reached the one-digit level
mark (8.9 percent), while annual GDP grew by almost 1 percent (0.8 percent). The response of
the Brazilian government and Central Bank to the crisis combined ￿scal consolidation, a strong
commitment with price stability, and external ￿nancial support.
The exchange rate was rapidly stabilized, market interest rates fell, and in￿ ation expec-
tations were brought under control, which allowed the Central Bank to lower interest rates
quite aggressively (from 45 percent to below 20 percent in a seven-months period). Besides
con￿dence￿ s strength, the extensive amount of exchange rate hedging, which isolates the non-
￿nancial private sector from the exchange rate devaluation, helps to explain the remarkably
small impact on output that followed the overshooting of the real. However, the transition to a
￿ oating exchange rate regime left some scars: public debt increased and became more sensitive
to exchange rate changes.
After the initial transition phase, with the normalization of ￿nancial conditions and under
the e⁄ects of signi￿cant interest rate cuts, in￿ ation ended 2000 right at the 6 percent mid-point
target, with robust economic growth of 4.4 percent. However, during 2000 a series of important
shocks occurred, notably: oil prices had double since 1999 while the prices of technology ￿rms
sharply felt, with the meltdown of NASDAQ. At the same time, monetary policy conditions
were tightened in the U.S. with fed funds rate being raised to 6.5 percent in May 2000, from
5.5 percent at the end of 1999.
Although the overall performance in 2000 was auspicious, the accelerate rate of growth
of the Brazilian economy at the margin combined with US and Global slowdown pointed to
di¢ culties ahead. Brazilian economic recovery that began at the end of 1999, was based on
strong credit expansion, increasing exports of industrial goods, and agricultural prices recovery.
This recovery, however, combined with increasing oil prices and US slowdown, adversely a⁄ected
the balance of trade, which entered negative territory (12 months) in September 2000 after a
period of recovery following the depreciation of the real in early 1999. Brazilian core IPCA
in￿ ation started to show a growth trend after November 2000.
4.4 In￿ ation targeting under stress: 2001 - 200225
After an initial increase in mid of 2001 - almost reaching the theoretical upper limit of 1 - ￿
su⁄ers two considerable reductions: (i) from 1 to 0.75, at the end of 2001, and (ii) the collapse
from almost 0.90 to 0.25 during the second half of 2002.
24We considered performing Kalman ￿lter analyses in order to model ￿ as a time varying parameter. However
the results were considerably unstable.
25See Bevilaqua and Loyo (2005) for a detailed description about Brazil￿ s stress test of in￿ ation targeting.
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 The year of 2001 was marked by a series of adverse shocks, most notably: the Argentina
default, o¢ cially announced in 2001Q4, the energy crises in Brazil, and the September 11
attack. In the beginning of the year, consumer price in￿ ation came above expectations, while
core in￿ ation trend was incompatible with the 4 percent in￿ ation target for the year. After
reducing the Selic rate26 to 15.25 percent in January, Central Bank started in March the ￿rst
monetary policy tightening cycle of the in￿ ation targeting regime. After an initial 50 basis
points increase, the tightening cycle was interrupted only in July, with the Selic rate reaching
19 percent. The policy rate remained unchanged from August 2001 to February 2002, when the
Central Bank began the easing process, although just from a brief period of time. The series of
adverse events produced during 2001 signi￿cant exchange rate depreciation, hovering around
20 percent. At the end of 2001, in￿ ation reached 7.7 percent (3.7 percentage points above the
4 percent target) and the economy grew 1.3 percent.
Even tough the target was not reached, the results obtained in face of an extremely adverse
scenario were satisfactory, revealing the in￿ ation targeting regime as an e⁄ective and ￿ exible
framework to pin down expectations. In￿ ation expectations for 2002, gauged at the end of 2001,
were still below 5 percent. The way monetary policy was conducted with the swift reaction
after the September 11 terrorist attacks kept expectations under control and made economic
agents believe that the 2001 adverse in￿ ationary shock would be dissipated during the following
year.
The year 2002 began with the view that the end of the energy crisis combined with an
improved international environment would allow some ￿ exibility in the conduct of monetary
policy. In fact, a considerable exchange rate appreciation occurred (from a 2.80 R$/US$ just
after September 11 to 2.40 R$/US$ in the beginning of May 2002). In this context, the monetary
policy was relaxed in the beginning of the year with the Selic rate being reduced from 19 percent
in February to 18 percent in June. However, later in the year, the uncertainty associated with
the presidential election sets o⁄ an unprecedented con￿dence crisis leading to sharp exchange
rate depreciation and to a very unfavorable debt-dynamics. During that time, a number of
arguments arose suggesting that particular circumstances distorted the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy, which was then bound for defeat against in￿ ation. Blanchard (2003) went as
far as suggesting that monetary policy might actually work in reverse, given Brazil￿ s large stock
of public debt. Increases in interest rates would worsen debt dynamics, increasing country risk
and making the exchange rate depreciate; with the pass-through from depreciation, tight money
would make in￿ ation higher rather than lower. Although theoretically plausible, Blanchard￿ s
empirical evidence is helped by not allowing monetary policy to have any impact on in￿ ation
through domestic aggregate demand. Indeed, as pointed out by Bevilaqua and Loyo (2005),
Brazil did succeed in securing disin￿ ation through monetary tightening, with a perceptible
contribution from the aggregate demand transmission channel.
The commitment assumed by the new President to sustain sound macroeconomic policies,
combining ￿scal discipline, a ￿ oating exchange rate regime, and the in￿ ation targeting frame-
work, was crucial to dissipate the fear associated with changes in the course of the economy
and related to debt sustainability. From September 2002 to December of the same year the
Central Bank increased its policy rate from 18 percent to 25 percent. However, the sharp
exchange rate depreciation during the year yielded a considerable increase of in￿ ation, which
ended 2002 at 12.5 percent, and a modest GDP growth of 1.9 percent. Although the in￿ ation
targeting regime was unable to anchor expectations during that year, the months that fol-
26The Selic interest rate, the Central Bank￿ s primary monetary policy instrument, is the average interest rate
on overnight inter-bank loans collateralized by government bonds that are registered with, and traded on, the
Sistema Especial de Liquida￿ªo e Cust￿dia (Selic). The Central Bank of Brazil Monetary Policy Committee
(COPOM) establishes a target for the Selic interest rate and the Central Bank￿ s open market desk executes
regular liquidity management operations in the domestic money market with the goal of keeping the daily Selic
interest rate at the target level.
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 lowed this episode proved that in￿ ation targeting has been a useful framework to align market
expectations with government objectives.
4.5 Reconstructing credibility: 2003 - 2004
Since the beginning of 2003 the target parameter displays a consistent recovery, reaching almost
0.75 at the end of 2004. In January 2003, the Central Bank sent an open letter to the Minister
of Finance explaining why the in￿ ation targets were breached, and made explicit estimates of
the size of the shocks and their persistence. The Central Bank added to the original in￿ ation
target for 2002 (4 percent) part of the breach experienced in the previous year, to account for
inertia e⁄ects (in￿ ation carryover from the 2002 shock) and for the impact on administered
prices that, by contract provisions, are adjusted according to past in￿ ation. These two e⁄ects
let the Central Bank to adjust the in￿ ation target for 2003 to 8.5 percent. The Central Bank
made explicit reference to the fact that, after the sharp increase in in￿ ation in 2002, attempting
to achieve the original in￿ ation target of 4 percent for 2003 would require a sizeable output
sacri￿ce. In￿ ation in 2003 came down by more than 3 percentage points, ending up at 9.3
percent, close to the adjusted target, and GDP declined by a modest 0.2 percent. Of course,
the Central Bank has not been able to do this on its own. The new government not only
supported the in￿ ation targeting regime but also pursued tight spending policies that have
resulted in a primary budget surplus in 2003 of 4.3 percent of GDP.
In 2004 GDP expanded vigorously with growth reaching almost 5 percent and with em-
ployment increasing at two-digit rate. However, the strong economic recovery in 2004 required
a gradual but ￿rm response of the Central Bank to ￿ght emerging in￿ ationary pressures and
prevent these pressures from contaminating in￿ ationary expectations. From September 2004
to May 2005 the Central Bank raised its policy rate by 3.75 percentage points to 19.75 percent.
Moreover, the government announced in September 2004 a change in the primary surplus tar-
get for 2004, from 4.25 to 4.5 percent of GDP. In￿ ation, despite some acceleration during the
second half of 2004, ended the year at 7.6 percent, above the 5.5 percent target, but within the
tolerance interval.
In September 2004, the Central Bank communicated to the public the new operational
target for 2005 of 5.1 percent. When it became clear to the Central Bank that the 5.5 percent
target for 2004 would not be ful￿lled and it was possible to project with greater accuracy the
2004 deviation, the Central Bank established 5.1 percent as its operational target to be pursued
in 2005.
4.6 Testing the robustness of the microfounded in￿ ation expectation
formation role
As depicted in Figure 5, note that ￿ fell signi￿cantly in the end of 2002 and remained low for
about four quarters. Thus, according to our previous result, Et￿t+1 must have been more sen-
sitive to exchange rate variations and past in￿ ation during 2002Q4 to 2003Q4. Simultaneously,
such a period was characterized by high in￿ ation rates and real depreciations.
The presented microfounded theory would predict that in￿ ation expectations must have
departed from the vicinities of in￿ ation targets during the mentioned period. Indeed, Figure 6
shows that the Brazilian 12-month ahead expected IPCA in￿ ation27 adheres quite well to the
in￿ ation target throughout the sample, except during the period from September 2002 to July
2003, in line with the theoretical model predictions.
27The Investor Relations Group of Central Bank of Brazil surveys in￿ ation expectations, among other in-
dicators. Until November 2001, 12-month ahead in￿ ation expectation was not available, so we interpolated
end-of-year in￿ ation expectation series.
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 Regarding ad hoc empirical approaches, Minella et al (2003) found that expected in￿ ation
reacts signi￿cantly to the in￿ ation targets, whose coe¢ cients were estimated around 1. On the
other hand, past in￿ ation rates￿coe¢ cient were low. In their study, 12-month ahead in￿ ation
expectations (survey) are regressed against their own lags, lagged 12-month in￿ ation rate, 12-
month ahead in￿ ation targets, lagged 12-month exchange rate variation, lagged interest rates
and lagged Brazilian risk premium (Embi plus), in four di⁄erent speci￿cations. When ending
the sample in mid 2002, just before the con￿dence crises, past in￿ ation is no longer signi￿cant.
Figure 7 and 8 show their recursive estimates of past in￿ ation and exchange rate variation
coe¢ cients.
In another similar approach, Cerisola and Gelos (2005) suggest that the in￿ ation target-
ing framework has helped anchor expectations in Brazil and that past in￿ ation￿ s importance
appears to be relatively low. The authors examine the macroeconomic determinants of sur-
vey in￿ ation expectations in Brazil since the adoption of in￿ ation targeting. They also ￿nd
that apart from the in￿ ation target, the stance of ￿scal policy, as proxied by the ratio of the
consolidated primary surplus to GDP, has been instrumental in shaping expectations.
Carvalho and Bugarin (2005) assess the formation rule of in￿ ation expectations in Mexico,
Brazil and Chile in recent years. Among other results, they ￿nd that credibility was high in
Chile and Mexico, with still some room for improvement. In Brazil, credibility was severely
undermined during the shock period, in 2002 and early 2003, when the framework failed to
coordinate expectations. They also build a theoretical model to investigate credibility in mon-
etary policy when in￿ ation targets are not set by the monetary authority, as is the case of
Brazil and Chile, and there is uncertainty about the preferences of the central banker. The
model shows that in￿ ation targets have a role in anchoring expectations. It also shows that in
countries with greater dispersion in central bankers￿preferences, strong-type central bankers
have to be more conservative in order to persuade society of their commitment to controlling
in￿ ation.
Therefore, it is possible to infer that our microfounded modeling is also an important contri-
bution to explain how expectations on future in￿ ation reacts to current shocks and to in￿ ation
targeting, just in line with some empirical evidence suggests.
5 Concluding remarks and challenges ahead
We develop and estimate a structural model of in￿ ation to measure the relevance of an explicit
target for in￿ ation. A New-Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) is derived incorporating in￿ ation
targets generalizing the Woodford￿ s (2003) hybrid curve.
On the theoretical side it is shown that the in￿ ation target a⁄ects the welfare-based mon-
etary policy objective function by penalizing deviations of actual in￿ ation from its implicit
target instead of from zero. This result establishes the micro foundation basis for ad-hoc loss
functions as indicated in the traditional literature. Therefore, the o¢ cial in￿ ation target also
a⁄ects the optimal target criterion.
Moreover, we present a microfounded formation rule for in￿ ation expectations, which pre-
dicts that when ￿rms attribute a high weight to the government￿ s in￿ ation target when setting
their on prices, exchange rate and demand shocks are unable to alter signi￿cantly in￿ ation
expectations, giving some light to empirical ad hoc assesment.
On the empirical side, we test the model using the Brazilian in￿ ation targeting period
(1999-2004). We ￿nd that the parameter associated with the target is quantitatively relevant
and statistically signi￿cant. Recursive estimates indicate that the parameter associated with the
target increases in periods when in￿ ation expectations are close enough to the o¢ cial targets.
The empirical evidence also shows that even after major shocks, the target ability of an-
choring in￿ ation has been restored. Although not formally tested, such a fact followed the
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 monetary authorities￿￿rm commitment to meet the in￿ ation targets, reinforced by the govern-
ment￿ s necessary support through a consistent ￿scal policy.
There are three possible extensions where future investigation would be quite useful. First,
the same analysis should be performed based on other countries data in order to verify if the
result that the o¢ cial target is relevant for in￿ ation is robust. Second, if ￿rms pay close atten-
tion to the in￿ ation target, the timing and magnitude of an individual ￿rm￿ s price adjustment
depends on the monetary authority actions. The e⁄ects of nominal disturbances on aggregate
real activity will also be policy-dependent, since the price level depends on the weight ￿rms
associate with the targets. As a result the weight associated with the target should not be
time-dependent but instead state-dependent. The challenge is how to make such transition in
a tractable manner. Finally, the model ignores the role of ￿scal policy in the process. Only
a model that consider the interrelation between monetary and ￿scal policies can draw a com-
prehensive picture of the credibility mechanism. In particular, the consequences for monetary
policy of an adoption of a ￿scal target can be directly assessed.
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Central Target Inflation Expectation Upper Limit Low er Limit
Figure 6: 12-Month Ahead In￿ ation Expectations and
12-Month Ahead In￿ ation Targets (Central and Tolerance Band)
Figure 7: Recursive Estimates of the Coe¢ cient on Past In￿ ation
Source: Minella et al (2003)
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 Figure 8: Recursive Estimates of the Coe¢ cient on Exchange Rate Depreciation.
Source: Minella et al (2003)
Table 1: Structural Estimates of Eq. (21)
Method 2SLS; 1996Q1 TO 2004Q4
Coef SE t p
A0 0.002 0.002 1.303 0.203
A1 0.689 0.177 3.896 0.001
A2 0.297 0.269 1.104 0.279
A3 0.053 0.031 1.714 0.097
A4 -0.113 0.107 -1.050 0.302
A5 0.049 0.023 2.130 0.041
R2 = 0:557 R2 Adj: = 0:484
Breusch-Godfrey LM Test28(2 lags): n ￿ R2 = 3:86; p = 0:15 fDist:￿2 (2)g
White Heteroskedasticity Test: F = 0:53; p = 0:91 fDist:F (24;11)g
28Our LM test was carried out regressing (OLS) the residuals against its lags (t-1) and (t-2) and against the
resulting vector of regressors from Eq. (21), replacing expectation and contemporaneous variables, except for
the pre-determined in￿ ation target, with the corresponding laggeg variables: ￿o
t ￿ ￿t￿1, ￿o
t+1 ￿ ￿t￿1, ￿et￿1 +
￿
f
t ￿ ￿t￿1, ￿t￿1, mct￿1 and qt￿1.
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 Table 2: Data Series and Sources
Serie Description Source
￿o
t In￿ ation targets BCBa
et Nominal exchange rate (R$/US$) BCBa
￿t In￿ ation rate series IBGEb
Yt Sªo Paulo￿ s metropolitan region GDP IBGEb (Quarterlized)
Lt Labor force series for Sªo Paulo Seadec
wt Average real wage series for Sªo Paulo Seadec
￿
f
t Foreing in￿ ation rate U.S. Department of Labord
SoT
CBond
t Brazilian C-Bond spread over US treasury Ipea Datae
mct Unit labor cost = wtLt=￿Yt; (￿ = 0:6)
￿qt Real exchange rate variation = ￿et+￿
f
t￿￿t
aBanco Central do Brasil (www.bcb.gov.br)
bInstituto. Brasileiro de Geogra￿a e Estat￿stica (www.ibge.gov.br)
cFunda￿ªo Sistema Estadual de AnÆlise de Dados (www.seade.gov.br/produtos/ped)
dBureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov)
eIpea Data (www.ipeadata.gov.br)
Obtaining Quarterly Sªo Paulo￿ s GDP
IPEA and IBGE released annual GDP (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2001
and 2002) from several cities in Brazil. In particular, we could aggregate GDP from Sªo
Paulo￿ s metropolitan region29 and determine its share to Brazilian GDP, for each year. Since
this indicator are not supposed to present a volatile pattern from a particular quarter to the
following one, except from seasonal idiosyncrasies, we generated quarterly shares minimizing the
sum of squared second di⁄erences constrained to the restriction that their annual average should
equal the previously estimated occurred shares for each one of the cited years. Following, we
applied this estimated quarterly shares to actual seasonally adjusted quarterly Brazilian GDP.
For years 2003, 2004 and 2005, for which such cities GDP were not released, we considered the
same quarterly share estimated to 2002Q4.
B Appendix: The closed-economy model
In our simple economy, there is a representative household whose problem is to intertemporally
decide about its consumption basket among di⁄erentiated goods in a continuum of unit mass
29Sªo Paulo￿ s metropolitan region encompasses 38 cities. The complete list of cities is available at
www.seade.gov.br.
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 ct (i), 8i 2 (0;1), and about its supplied labor ht (i). For each good i, there is only one ￿rm i,
specialized only in that type of production. For so, each ￿rm hires the specialized labor ht (i),
at wage wt (i). Suppose, as usual, that individual ￿rms￿ s decisions have no in￿ uence on wages
One aggregates consumption Ct in (22) as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), assuming constant












De￿ne u(C;￿) as the concave consumption utility function, and ￿ (h;￿) as the convex labor
disutility function. Both are strictly increasing in their ￿rst arguments. For each of them, ￿ is
a vector of preference shocks.
One may de￿ne the aggregated price index Pt as follows. Note that each consumer gets
utility only by the quantity of aggregated consumption Ct, independently on how the distrib-
ution of the consumption basket are set among the continuum of goods. Hence, the hicksian
demand for each good i is determined by the following spending minimization problem, given















Where pt (i) is the unit price for good type i. Optimal solution implies that Pt the demand


















Assuming that ￿nancial assets are evenly share among all consumers in period zero, complete
markets imply in identical budget restrictions for every household, so that the representative














s:t: PtCt + Et (Qt;t+1Wt+1) ￿ Wt +
1 R
0





Where Wt is the nominal ￿nancial wealth held by the household in the beginning of period
t, Qt;t+1 is the stochastic discounting factor that must exist under absence of arbitrage and ￿
is the preference discounting factor. Finally, ￿t (i) represents the nominal pro￿t from selling
each good i.
A necessary condition for the existence of a solution of such an intertemporal problem is



















 In equilibrium, all aggregated production must be consumed (Ct = Yt). So, one obtains the
standard Euler equation (27) and the expression (28) for the real wage wt (i)=Pt of type i.
(1 + it)

















One may log-linearize the Euler equation and obtain the standard IS equation (29), relating







to real ex-ante interest rate b rt. Here, Y n
t is the natural
product, the one prevailing under ￿ exible prices. The ￿hat￿symbol refers to log-deviations
from steady state levels.
xt = xt+1 ￿ ￿ (b rt ￿ b r
n
t ) (29)
















Additionally, b rt =
￿
b it ￿ Et￿t+1
￿




Y and ￿￿1 = ￿
uCC(Y ;0)
uC(Y ;0) Y is the steady
state relative risk aversion index.
Regarding to ￿rm decisions, the core of our modeling analysis, assume that each ￿rm pro-
duction function assumes the functional form shown in (30), where At models an exogenous
time varying technology parameter and f(￿) is a concave and increasing function. Therefore,
the only cost source for each ￿rm is labor cost, as follows:
yt (i) = Atf (ht (i)) (30)
Costt (i) = wt (i) ￿ ht (i)
In such a context, since ￿rms face monopolistic competition with individual demand for each




￿t (i) = pt (i) ￿ yt (i) ￿ wt (i) ￿ f￿1 ￿
A
￿1
t ￿ yt (i)
￿





Optimal solution implies the traditional result in which all ￿rms apply the same markup
term ￿ = ￿=(￿ ￿ 1) > 1 to their marginal costs. So, in a ￿ exible price setting equilibrium, all
￿rms face the same marginal cost in all periods and they all set the same optimum price:
p
￿
t = Pt = ￿ ￿ MCt (i)
Where MCt (i) is the nominal marginal cost of each ￿rm.
An equivalent result may be written as ￿ ￿ mct (i) = 1, where mct (i) = MCt (i)=Pt is the
real marginal cost.
Note that mct (i) can be also represented as mct (i) = mc[yt (i);Yt;￿t] =
e ￿y(yt(i);￿t)
uC(Yt;￿t) , where









. Thus, one implicitily de￿nes the previously mentioned
natural product Y n
t , the aggregated product level prevailing under an equilibrium of ￿ exible
prices, as follows:
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t ;￿t] = 1 (32)






On the other hand, under a price stickiness environment, we state that, in every period,
each ￿rm faces the same probability (1 ￿ ￿) of setting an optimal price and ￿ of readjusting
their prices according to the following rule of thumb:
pt (i) = pt￿1 (i) ￿ ￿￿
t (34)




t￿1, ￿t = Pt
Pt￿1, ￿o
t = (1 + ￿o
t) and ￿o
t is the o¢ cial in￿ ation
target rate for period t.







￿T￿tQt;T ￿ ￿[pt (i);PT;￿T]




￿+1 ￿ CostT (i)
CostT (i) = wT (i) ￿ f￿1 ￿
A
￿1
T ￿ yT (i)
￿















T￿tQt;T ￿ ￿p [p
￿






























Since the term inside the brackets equals zero in the steady state, we may log-linearize the
whole expression around the steady state values as follows31:













￿+1 ￿ c mcT (i)
#




















t + (1 ￿ ￿)￿t￿1, as previously shown in (6).
Since mc[yt (i);Yt;￿t] =
e ￿y(yt(i);￿t)
uC(Yt;￿t) , we log-linearize it as follows:
30The assumed regularity conditions of preferences and production function implies that the ￿rst order con-
dition are su¢ cient to describe the maximum point.
31Remember that (33) directly implies ￿￿mc = 1.
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= !^ yt (i) + ￿mc￿















































e ￿y(Y ;0) , qt ￿ ￿
e ￿y￿(￿ Y ;0)
e ￿yy(￿ Y ;0)￿ Y ￿t and gt ￿ ￿
uC￿(￿ Y ;0)
uCC(￿ Y ;0)￿ Y ￿t.
We may also log-linearize (22) as ^ Yt ￿
R 1




c mct (i)di ￿
￿
! + ￿






Log-linearizing the demand function in period T, we have ^ yT (i) = ^ YT + ￿log(PT=pT (i)).




￿+1, for T > t Hence it is easy to obtain c mcT (i) ￿
















































Leading the previous relation in one period, applying the expectance operator and consid-

























































c mct + (1 ￿ ￿￿)log(Pt) ￿ ￿￿Et￿
￿
t+1 (40)
Moreover, from (24) and (34), the aggregated price Pt may be represented as follows:
Pt =
h
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ (p
￿
t)






We log-linearize it and obtain log(Pt) = (1 ￿ ￿)log(p￿
t) + ￿log(Pt￿1) + ￿￿￿
t. Such an
expression is equivalent to:
log(p
￿






















Substituting in (40), we obtain the following New-Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC):
￿t ￿ ￿
￿







Where we de￿ned ￿ ￿
(1￿￿)(1￿￿￿)
￿(1+!￿) .
Note that the NKPC￿ s most fundamental structural form regards the real marginal cost, in
log terms, c mct. Nevertheless, traditional empirical evidence consider the output gap xt instead
of c mct. Actually, it is standard to rewrite (42) considering an output measure if the production
function assumes the functional form shown in (30), as follows:
From (32) and (38), we obtain (!qt+￿￿1gt) ￿ (! + ￿￿1) ^ Y n
t . Hence, from (39), the following






Therefore, the NKPC could also represented as follows, as previously shown in (5):
￿t ￿ ￿
￿











From now on, one shows how the adoption of an explicit in￿ ation target a⁄ects the optimal
monetary policy that maximizes the representative household welfare W0, represented bellow.
Actually, one shows that its second order approximation assumes the opposite form of the










As in Woodford (2003), a second order approximation of (44) can be ￿rstly represented as
follows32:
32Such an approximation independs on the actual source of price stickiness and its derivation is very standard
in recent monetary policy analysis. Therefore, we skip its analytical steps.
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xt ￿ c Y ￿
￿2
+ ￿(1 + !￿)V ari log(pt (i))
￿







Where e ￿t is the aggregated exogenous shock vector33, tip colects the policy-independent
terms and Y ￿ is the e¢ cient production level, that globally maximazes Ut in every period, and





. Such a production level implicitly solves:
mc[Y
￿;Y
￿;0] = 1 (46)
Note that the e¢ cient production does not necessarily equal to the steady state production
level, for it is de￿ned as in (33). Hence, the ine¢ ciency parameter ￿y, that must be small







= 1 ￿ ￿
￿1
Despite the fact that such an approximation independs on the addopted price stickiness
source, the variance of log(pt (i)), in i, depends.
Note that (41) can be log-linearized as follows:
log(Pt) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ log(p
￿
t) + ￿ ￿ [log(Pt￿1) + ￿
￿
t]
De￿ning Pt ￿ Ei log(pt (i)) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ log(p￿


















One now may adress the variance issue, de￿ning ￿t ￿ V ari log(pt (i)).
Since (log(Pt￿1) + ￿￿
t) independs on i, ￿t may also be represented as:


















Ei log(pt (i)) ￿
￿



































log(pt￿1 (i)) ￿ P t￿1
￿2
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t (￿t ￿ ￿
￿
t)
2 + tip (47)





tLt + tip + O















But now, the relative weight of output gap is endogenous and depend on its coe¢ cient in
the NKPC ￿ = ￿=￿. The level parameter ￿ is de￿ned as ￿ =
Y uC
2 ￿(! + ￿￿1).
Note that, as long as ￿￿
t is not a function of any variable regarding a particular ￿rm i,
our results ultimately independs on the way ￿￿
t is de￿ned34. Otherwise, (log(Pt￿1) + ￿￿
t) will
depend on i, and the result on ￿t will not be achieved.
C Appendix: Formation rule of in￿ ation expectations
Recursively solving equation (16), we easily obtain the following result:










Lagging the former equation in one period, we obtain an expression for ￿t￿1 to be substituted
in (50), so we rewrite it as follows:
￿t = (1 ￿ ￿)
























Leading (51) in one period, we asssess an expression for ￿t+1:
34Therefore, another indexation rule of thumb is likely to generate the same result.
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 ￿t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)
























Considering then the iterating expectatives property, we obtain the following expression for
Et￿t+1:
Et￿t+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)














Et￿qt+1 + ~ ￿
￿
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